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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant's brief defines the correct issue and standard for 
review in regards to the first question presented for appeal. The 
additional findings were presented to the trial court in the 
plaintiff's response to defendant's Rule 52 motion, and, as shown 
below, the trial court has no authority to enter additional 
findings after judgment is entered by the court. 
In regards to the third issue presented for review, 
Plaintiff's suggested formulation is too restrictive, as it ignores 
the other three findings which the court cited to as justifying the 
award of an inequitable share of the marital estate to the 
plaintiff. If those other factors are included, either of the 
parties formulation of issue 3 are adequate. 
In regards to the fifth issue, plaintiff has included 
unnecessary factual information in his formulation. The question 
is whether the ranch was under the jurisdiction of the court and 
whether the ranch should have been included in the court's 
distribution of assets. The court clearly made the award and 
factored it into its calculations regarding the distribution of 
other assets. As conceded by the plaintiff, the defendant did not 
have good title to the property at the time of the divorce. 
Plaintiff's Brief at 12. 
In deciding whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the 
ranch, determining whether property can properly be included in the 
estate is a matter of law and is reviewed for correctness. See 
1 
Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah App. 1996). Only 
after the marital assets are determined is the trial court's 
property division reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Endrody, 914 P.2d at 1168-9. 
II. FACTUAL INACCURACIES 
Plaintiff in her brief attempts to introduce several issues as 
to which the trial court either did not find or made no finding. 
The Plaintiff attempts to introduce the notion of fault, as she did 
at trial, by referring to the defendant's future wife as his 
"girlfriend." See Plaintiff's Brief at 5, 9, 12, 14, 32, 37. The 
trial court specifically found that the plaintiff had failed to 
meet her burden of proof on this issue. (R. 504). 
The plaintiff further states on several occasions that the 
defendant was "entitled" to receive the ranch at the time the 
parties were divorced. Plaintiff's Brief at 5. However, it is 
clear from the record that the defendant did not obtain title to 
the property by inheritance from his mother until after the date of 
trial. 
The plaintiff also cites to the defendant's purchase of a ring 
for his current wife and his failure to sell the parties Corvette 
as possible further rationales for the court's inequitable award of 
the marital estate in this case. Plaintiff's Brief at 11, 14, 32. 
These items were not stated by the trial court as factors in its 
award of property. The lower court did not order the Corvette to 
be sold at trial as stated in Plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff's Brief 
at 11, R. 511. 
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Other irrelevant items, testified to by the plaintiff, but not 
found by the trial court as a basis for its decision, were cited by 
the plaintiff, such as the alleged fact that the defendant was 
upset at the plaintiff for working, the fact that the plaintiff 
objected to the Arma-Coating business, and the fact that plaintiff 
was not aware that the defendant was going to cash in his 
retirement account. Plaintiff's Brief at 7, 9, 10. 
The plaintiff states that "Defendant agreed that [plaintiff] 
could use the income tax refund" to purchase the condominium. 
Plaintiff's Brief at 10. It is clear from the record that the 
Plaintiff did contract to purchase the condominium and pay the 
initial $500 down, in violation of the court's order restraining 
the parties from disposing of marital assets, without the 
defendant's consent or knowledge. The parties disputed whether the 
plaintiff permitted the defendant to put the other funds down, and 
the court made no finding on that issue. (R. 928-9). 
The income amounts stated by the plaintiff in her brief refer 
to the defendant's gross income, while the income imputed by the 
trial court apparently refers to net income. Plaintiff's Brief at 
13. 
Plaintiff also refers to a document, Defendant's Proposed 
Findings of Fact, which was unverified, unsigned, and not part of 
the record on appeal. Plaintiff's Brief at 12, 31. 
III. LOWER COURT'S AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS IMPROPER 
Plaintiff cites Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 p.2d 999 (Utah 
App. 1988), for the proposition that "Filing a motion under Rule 59 
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 'suspend the finality of the 
judgment . . .'" In Anderson, the court dismissed an appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction where the notice of appeal was filed prior to 
the trial court's ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion. The issue was 
whether the appellate court had jurisdiction, not whether the trial 
court had the authority to amend the findings in the case. The 
issue in the present matter is not whether the judgment was final, 
but whether it was entered. 
Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
"A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes . . . when the same is signed and filed . . ." [emphasis 
added]. Here, the original judgment was entered on March 3, 1997, 
before the trial court entered its amended findings. 
The Plaintiff, in his brief, then goes on to argue that 
"Pending entry of a final Judgement, the trial court has authority 
to make additional findings or alter its judgment." No citation is 
cited for this proposition. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
only one method for the amendment of findings, and that is by 
motion of the parties in Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civile 
Procedure. Said motion must be filed not later than 10 days after 
the entry of judgment. The judgment is considered complete when it 
is entered. Even if it were the case that the trial court could 
freely amend its findings before the entry of its judgment, the 
court had no authority to amend the findings as here its judgment 
was already entered. 
The Plaintiff further states that "the trial court is 
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certainly not bound to merely grant or deny the relief requested in 
a Rule 59 Motion if it appears that additional findings may be 
appropriate or necessary." Again, no citation is provided. The 
defendant's motion to amend the findings only requested additional 
findings as to the status of the Mountain Meadows Ranch as marital 
or separate property (R. 418). It did not request additional 
findings regarding circumstances which required the award of a 
disproportionate portion of the marital estate to the plaintiff. 
The court denied the defendant's motion for additional findings. 
Plaintiff's Brief at 15. The plaintiff did not properly file a 
motion to amend the findings under Rule 52 (b), and that is the only 
method provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the 
findings. 
IV. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT INCONSISTENT WITH 
PRIOR FINDINGS AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
In regards to the court's amended finding that the defendant's 
termination of his employment "deprived the Plaintiff of the 
benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement account had 
he worked until he became entitled to full retirement benefits," it 
is clear from the court's own findings and judgment that the 
plaintiff was provided sufficient income for her needs. Plaintiff 
apparently argues that an increased sum of alimony would have been 
awarded to her had the defendant continued to work. In considering 
the amount of alimony to award, the court shall consider "the 
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the 
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income, and the 
ability of the payor spouse to provide support." § 30-3-5 (7) Utah 
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Code Ann. Here, the plaintiff has income of $540 per month, 
receives $850 in rental income from the marital home awarded to her 
free and clear, and $600 in alimony from the defendant. With her 
financial need of $2,000, she is provided income equal to her 
expenses and no increased amount of alimony would have been 
appropriate. Further, the defendant, even if he had kept his 
teaching position on a "regular" schedule, would not have had any 
greater ability to pay alimony to the plaintiff. His gross income 
would have been approximately $3,000 per month and he had monthly 
expenses of $2,400. Regardless of whether the defendant had 
continued working as a school teacher, his actions would not have 
"deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income" as stated in 
the court's findings. 
Whether the defendant had continued to work would have been 
largely irrelevant as far as any benefit received by the plaintiff 
for the defendant's retirement account. If the retirement benefits 
had been split between the parties, the defendant would have had 
less ability to pay alimony and the plaintiff's alimony award would 
have to be reduced. There was no testimony at trial as to what 
amount the defendant would have received from his retirement 
account on a monthly basis had he worked until retirement, but the 
net value of the account, before taxes, only three years prior to 
his retirement was less than $70,000. Even if the defendant were 
to receive income from the account in the amount of $3,000 per 
month, his income while working on a "regular" schedule (which at 
$36,000 per year would have exhausted the retirement account in 
6 
less than two years), the amount of alimony would not have changed. 
The size of the retirement account, which is less than 10% of the 
marital estate, does not justify such a disproportionate award of 
the marital estate. 
The lower court in its amended findings found that: 
Although some of [the retirement account] funds were used to 
assist the Plaintiff with reference to acquisition of her 
condominium, most of the funds were used to pay a debt 
incurred in conjunction with the Defendant's opening a 
business against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were 
still married, a[n] asset which, according to the Court's 
findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant 
dissipated almost all of that retirement account. Plaintiff 
should receive a greater balance of the marital estate (R. 
509) . 
Again, the amount of the retirement account, which had a net pre-
tax value of less than $70,000, is less than 10% of the value of 
the marital estate. Such a small amount is insufficient to justify 
the award of 97.75% of the marital estate to the plaintiff. 
Further, this finding is inconsistent with the court's other 
findings and findings at trial. The lower court found that the 
funds from the retirement account were used to "refinance the Arma 
Coating business and also to put a substantial down payment on the 
Condominium which the Plaintiff is now occupying." (R. 503). The 
trial court acknowledged the "responsibility that [the defendant] 
felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a 
manner appropriate to her standard of living." (R. 503). At 
trial, when counsel for the defendant sought to further expand on 
the issue of the liquidation of the retirement account and the 
defendant's efforts to preserve the funds that the plaintiff had 
invested in the condominium, the court stated that: 
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Counsel, let me ask you about this because I — I may be 
missing something, but the condo had a stipulated value for 
purposes of this trial of $135,000. At the time that Myrlene 
Lytle determined to acquire that condo, she put $500 down on 
it, and by her own testimony, did not discuss that with 
Clinton Lytle. However, when the $4,500 to make the rest of 
the $5,000 down payment was needed, that was acquired through 
the tax return refund. 
The balance of the loan obtained by Mr. Lytle in his best 
efforts and that now accounts for the purchase of the condo 
(R. 928) . 
After counsel for the defendant explained why he wished to further 
delve into this issue, the court found that: 
And it makes perfectly good sense to me for them not to walk 
away from $5,000. It makes a very reasonable economic 
decision on Mr. Lytle's part not to lose that money when it's 
tied up in a tangible asset such as the condo. I do not think 
there's a dispute over that. 
I fault neither of these parties for having taken that effort, 
number one, not to lose the $5,000, and, number two, make sure 
that Mrs. Lytle has a reasonable dwelling that is 
approximating her standard of living during the marriage. It 
makes perfectly good sense to me, counsel, and I just don't 
know why we have to talk about it so much, [emphasis added] 
(R. 928-9) . 
In this matter, the plaintiff invested $500 of marital funds to 
purchase a condominium without the plaintiff's permission. This 
violated the court's order regarding the disposition of marital 
assets. The parties disagreed, and the court made no finding, 
whether the next $4,500 put down on the condo was done with the 
defendant's consent. It is clear from the record that the 
defendant did not sign the income refund tax check. (R. 929). In 
order to preserve those deposited funds, the defendant paid off a 
loan on the Arma-Coating business in order to obtain a mortgage on 
the condominium (R. 665, 745). At trial, the court found fault 
with neither of the parties for their actions. 
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Further, the liquidation of the retirement account did not 
violate a court order. The order in question, entered August 29, 
1995, restrained each party "from transferring or disposing" of any 
property unless the other party consents. (R. 109). Although the 
defendant liquidated the retirement account, there is no evidence 
that he transferred or disposed of it without the consent of the 
plaintiff. The stipulation of the parties, entered into evidence, 
states that the defendant could use "his retirement to pay off a 
loan to Arma Coating and is borrowing $130,000 to complete purchase 
of Myrlene's new condo." (R. 595). The stipulation states that 
the defendant "could use" the retirements funds for that purpose, 
not that he had already used them. 
Further, the funds used to pay the Arma-Coating business debt 
were not dissipated. The debt was paid in order for the defendant 
to obtain a loan to purchase the condominium. Arma-Coating was a 
marital asset and the debts thereon were marital debts. Although 
the business was found by the lower court to have a net value of 
$0, if the debts had not been paid it would have had a negative net 
value. Thus the funds from the retirement account were used to pay 
a marital debt, and regardless of whether the funds were used for 
that purpose the net value of the marital estate would have 
remained the same. 
In regards to the court's finding that the plaintiff "is 
clearly unable to support herself at the standard of living to 
which she is entitled with the amount of alimony awarded by the 
Court and her own earned income," and that she "still falls 
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approximately $900 short each month of being able to meet her 
financial needs/' this finding ignores the fact the plaintiff 
receives $850 in income from the rental of the marital home, which 
she was awarded free and clear. The court included this factor in 
its award of alimony in paragraph 41 of its findings, and also 
found that "Plaintiff also has the building lot which is probably 
worth something that she could sell and live off of for quite a 
while and maybe not even have to work for a period of time. . . ." 
(R. 508) . 
The lower court's finding that "technically, the Plaintiff may 
not have acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows 
Ranch because of work she performed on that property during the 
parties marriage and while it was still titled in the name of the 
Defendant's parents, her contribution toward that asset ought to be 
considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marital 
property", is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to Utah law. 
Any contribution made towards the ranch was made while it was owned 
by someone else. As the plaintiff can not claim any legal interest 
in the ranch, she seeks to be awarded an equitable interest. There 
is no Utah case or statute under which an equitable interest in the 
property could be awarded to the plaintiff. There is no evidence 
at trial that the defendant or his parents intended such an 
interest to be awarded to the plaintiff. Nor is there any evidence 
that the plaintiff's contribution in any way enhanced the value of 
ranch or increased the chance that the defendant would inherit it. 
Further, the plaintiff's contribution towards that asset was 
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minimal. From the plaintiff's testimony, it appears that she may 
have assisted in harvesting gardens, canning, and feeding the cows 
briefly when the defendant was ill with a heart condition. She 
also rode on the back of a tractor while the defendant worked. 
Most of her testimony on this issue is in regards to the 
defendant's efforts on the ranch, rather than her own. The 
transcript of the plaintiff's testimony in this regard is attached 
in the addendum to this brief. (R. 706-9). Such contributions are 
insufficient to provide for such an inequitable distribution of the 
parties's estate, especially when considering that the plaintiff's 
parents, by inter vivos gift, transferred to the parties 40 acres 
of real estate with a current value of $1,500,000. This fully 
compensated the plaintiff for any "contribution" made to the ranch. 
The plaintiff, in her brief, misconstrues the holding of 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). There, the 
parties at trial requested that the lower court provide them with 
guidance by deciding whether certain shares of stock, donated to 
the husband, should be considered in their settlement negotiations. 
The court ruled that the stock "is property of the marriage and 
should be taken into consideration by the court in dividing all 
marital property on a fair and equitable basis." Mortensen, 760 
P.2d at 305. The parties later stipulated that the husband should 
receive the shares of stock, but only one-third of the marital 
estate. 
The husband appealed the trial court's ruling regarding the 
stock. The Supreme Court stated that a two-thirds award to the 
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Defendant may not have been inequitable based upon (1) the superior 
education and income of the husband, (2) the fact that three minor 
children of the parties lived at home, (3) the wife waived her 
right to alimony, (4) the wife's agreement to a reduced amount of 
child support, and (5) the fact that the husband was awarded his 
entire retirement account. 
Those factors relevant to Mortensen are not present in the 
instant matter. The defendant had only three years until full 
retirement, at which time his superior education would not have 
yielded a superior income. There were no minor children of the 
parties and the plaintiff sought, and received, an award of 
alimony. Further, the retirement account in this case was used for 
the mutual benefit of the parties and was exhausted before trial. 
The court in Mortensen found that "In view of these factors, 
it would not have inequitable for the trial court to award 
plaintiff two-thirds of the remaining property and defendant one-
third, giving no weight at all to the fact that he received his 
shares of stock." [emphasis added] Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 309. 
The court thus did not consider the separate property as 
justification for the disproportionate award. This comports with 
the courts discussion of gifted or inherited property, quoted here 
at length as a concise summary of pertinent Utah law on the issue: 
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable" 
property division pursuant to Section 30-3-5 should, in 
accordance with the rule prevailing in most other 
jurisdictions and with the division made in many of our own 
cases, generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift 
and inheritance during the marriage . . . to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, 
unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her own efforts or 
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expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra, or (2) the property 
has been consumed or its identify lost through commingling or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse. ££. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). An exception to this 
rule would be where part or all of the gift or inheritance is 
awarded to the nondonee or nonheir spouse in lieu of alimony 
as was done in Weaver v. Weaver, supra. The remaining 
property should be divided equitably between the parties as in 
other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict 
mathematical equality. Teece v. Teecer 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 
1986) . However, in making that division, the donee or heir 
spouse should not lose the benefit of his or her gift or 
inheritance by the trial court's automatically or arbitrarily 
awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the remaining 
property which was acquired by their joint efforts to offset 
the gifts or inheritance. [emphasis added] 
Mortensenr 760 P.2d at 308. In her brief, the plaintiff, without 
citing authority, states that "Clearly, a trial court should 
consider a party's separate property in fashioning its equitable 
award of marital property." (Respondent's Brief, 28). This is 
directly contrary to the directions to trial courts given above. 
The court in Mortensen went on to discuss those factors that 
could result in such a disproportionate award: eliminating the need 
for alimony or support for the nondonee spouse and to provide 
housing for the children. Neither of these factors is present in 
the instant matter. 
These rules, states the court, "preserve and give effect to 
the right that married persons have always had in this state to 
separately own and enjoy property" and "accords with the normal 
intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts and 
inheritances be kept within their family and succession should not 
be diverted because of divorce." Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 308-9. 
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The defendant's rights in this case and the intentions of his 
parents have been foiled by the trial court. 
Plaintiff notes that Mortensen cites to Weaver v. Weaver, 442 
P.2d 928 (Utah 1968), and others, as cases where the court approved 
of a disproportionate award of the marital estate. In Weaver, the 
parties had accumulated assets of $750,000. The court awarded one-
half of the estate to each party. The plaintiff in that case was 
completely disabled and the she was not awarded alimony. The 
defendant claimed that $500,000 of the total estate should not have 
been equitably divided, as a "considerable portion" of those assets 
had been acquired by purchase and gift from his father and sister. 
It is not clear where the remainder of the fund associated with the 
$500,000 came from. After reviewing the record, the court could 
not say that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and was 
inclined to the view that the record supported the findings and 
conclusions of the court below. The court made no finding that the 
$500,000 was not part of the marital estate as claimed by the 
defendant. Weaver is thus not a case of an inequitable 
distribution as claimed by the plaintiff. Factually, the present 
case is dissimilar as the plaintiff here is not disabled and was 
awarded alimony. 
The plaintiff in her brief states that "The trial court did 
not divide the parties' marital estate based on a strict 
mathematical formula and is not required to do so." For this 
proposition, plaintiff cites Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 
1986). In that case, the defendant argued that his share of the 
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down-payment in a home, which totaled $6,500, came from a pre-
marital asset. The trial court divided the equity in the home 
equally. The defendant claimed that he should have been reimbursed 
for his premarital contribution before dividing the equity. The 
Supreme Court found conflicting evidence as to whether the down 
payment was from premarital funds, but found that: 
even if we accept as true the defendant's testimony as the 
source of the $6,500 contribution, the difference in the 
contributions made by the two parties was no so great as to 
give rise to any abuse of discretion of the trial court. 
Mathematical equality in the division of each marital property 
is not required. 
Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d at 107. The court in Teece was not 
approving of a radical and disproportionate distribution of the 
marital estate. In that case, the amount of money in dispute was 
minor, and the court held that the equitable distribution did not 
have be a strictly mathematical 50/50 split. Here, the value of 
the estate awarded to the plaintiff above her one-half share is 
more than $300,000. The language in Teece was not intended to be, 
and has not been, used to uphold such a inequitable distributions. 
"Mathematical equality" may not be required, but Teece does not 
remove the requirement of equality itself in the distribution of 
assets. 
V. ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER RANCH 
In fashioning an equitable award of property, the factors 
generally to be considered by trial courts are: 
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the 
property was acquired before or during the marriage; the 
source of the property; the health of the parties; the 
parties1 standard of living, respective financial conditions, 
needs, and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the 
15 
children of the marriage; the parties1 ages at time of 
marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the 
marriage; and the necessary relationship the property division 
has with the amount of alimony and child support to be 
awarded. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). In relation to the 
above factors, there is a substantial estate in this case, the 
marital estate was acquired during the marriage, the entire net 
value of the marital estate was acquired by inter vivos gift from 
the defendant's parents, both parties are in adequate health but 
are nearing retirement age, and the defendant may have some 
financial need which is remedied by the courts award of alimony. 
None of these factors supports a disproportionate award. These 
factors to be considered by trial courts do specifically not 
include the presence of an equitable interest in inherited 
property. 
VI. PROPERTY AWARD DID NOT ACHIEVE FAIR, JUST EQUITABLE RESULT 
The plaintiff claims that the property distribution in this 
case achieves a fair, just, and equitable result and cites 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994), which in 
turn cited Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1990). Neither of 
these cases deals with the "fair, just and equitable" exception to 
the general rule that each party in should receive the real and 
personal property he or she inherited during the marriage. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 306; Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1982) . In Finlayson, there was a dispute regarding whether a 
certain debt was a gift or a loan from one of the parties' parents. 
There was not any dispute whether any separate property justified a 
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disproportionate award of the marital estate. In Dunn, the trial 
court allowed the defendant a credit for separate property which 
was later consumed and commingled. The appellate court properly 
held that this was improper. This clearly has no application to 
the present matter, as the defendant did not acquire the ranch 
until after the parties divorce and had no opportunity to consume 
or otherwise lose the ranch's identity through commingling or 
exchanges. That is essentially a question of whether the ranch is 
separate or marital property, and the Plaintiff has here conceded 
that the ranch is separate property. Defendant's Brief, 5, 13. 
The trial court in Dunn also awarded 76% of the marital estate 
to the defendant and 24% to the plaintiff. That award, as in the 
present case, was based upon a factor not included in Burke, supra. 
Although the award in Dunn is less inequitable than in the present 
case, the decision was remanded and the trial court instructed to: 
first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the 
marital estate or as the separate property of one of the other 
. . . . Each party is then presumed to be entitled to all of 
his her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property, [emphasis added] 
Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1323. 
The court in Dunn, when stating the "fair, just and equitable" 
language on which the defendant principally relies to justify the 
inequitable distribution in this case, cites only to Noble v. 
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988). In that case, the court approved 
of the award of the husband's separate property to the wife because 
the husband shot the wife in the head at close range with a rifle 
while she was lying on their bed. While any distribution could be 
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justified as "fair, just and equitable," examination of the 
reasoning behind that standard, evidenced in Noble, leaves no doubt 
that such a rationale is inapplicable to this case. 
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the trial 
court awarded a disproportionate portion of the marital estate to 
the plaintiff, apparently due to the fact that the defendant had 
substantial inherited property. The appellate court held that the 
same was improper without additional findings and remanded the case 
to the district court. The plaintiff cites from Burt language that 
the court may award an interest in inherited property to the non-
heir spouse in "other extraordinary situations where equity so 
demands." citing Mortensenf 760 P.2d at 308. Note that the 
extraordinary situation is one which equity "demands" such a 
result. Mortensen provides that: 
The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated property, 
particulary if it is income producing, may be properly be 
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by 
that spouse or as a source of income for the payment of child 
support or alimony (where awarded) by that spouse. Such 
property might also be utilized to provide housing for minor 
children in other utilized in other extraordinary situations 
where equity so demands. 
Id. Justice Zimmerman, in his concurring opinion, stated that 
The overarching general rule remains the same in any divorce 
case: to provide adequate support for the children of the 
marriage, Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987), and to 
divide the economic assets and income stream of the parties so 
as to permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage. See eg. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 
(Utah 1988) . 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 310. The other "extraordinary situations" 
described in the Mortensen opinion all deal with alimony and minor 
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children. This is in accord with Justice Zimmerman's concurrence. 
However, in this case there are no minor children of the parties. 
Further, the defendant is awarded a home and substantial other 
assets, all debt free, to maintain her at her standard of living 
during the marriage. 
Justice Zimmerman's concurrence cited Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) as an example of where equity demanded that 
the separate property of one party be awarded to the other spouse. 
Noble, the case where the husband disabled the wife by shooting her 
in the head with a rifle, was cited above as the root of the "fair, 
just and equitable" language found in Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 843 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The court's finding that the plaintiff's contributions to the 
ranch equitably requires that she be awarded the entire marital 
estate is fundamentally only an argument that the ranch should be 
included in the marital estate. Her efforts prior to the ranch 
being deeded to the defendant are irrelevant. If she had performed 
these actions and the defendant had not received the ranch from his 
parents, would she then claim that she should receive 97.75% of the 
marital estate? The key factor in the court's decision is 
therefore not whether the plaintiff contributed to the ranch, but 
whether the defendant received it, and that is impermissible under 
Mortensen. 
VII. LOWER COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER RANCH 
The plaintiff correctly states the rule regarding whether the 
trial court has jurisdiction over property: was it "any right that 
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has accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit." 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). From 
the record it is apparent that defendant did not obtain title to 
the ranch until 1997, after the parties divorce. The defective deed 
from his parents estate was not even recorded until February of 
1995, a month after the parties separation. Any right he had to 
any present or future benefit did not accrue until after the 
marriage. Plaintiff notes in her brief that his interest in the 
ranch was not "technically a present benefit." Plaintiff's Brief, 
35-6. However, as the defendant did not have good title to the 
property at the time of divorce, the future benefit did not 
"accrue," as a legally enforceable claim, until after the marriage. 
Plaintiff, in her brief, quotes the defendant's testimony at trial 
that it was his "understanding that [he] would receive" the ranch, 
[emphasis added] (R. 651, 652). This again confirms that the 
defendant would, at some future time, accrue some present or future 
benefit, but that he had not received the same at the time of 
trial. 
For marital assets to be distributed, the assets must be in 
the possession of one, or both, of the marital parties. Endrody v. 
Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1996). The court in 
Endrody stated that "While possession usually connotes physical 
possession, we believe it also connotes legal possession." Jd. At 
the time of trial in this matter, the defendant did not have 
rightful legal possession of the ranch and the same could not be 
awarded or considered by the trial court. 
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VIII. ALIMONY AWARD INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS ACTION 
The defendant does not have the ability to pay alimony, and 
the plaintiff is awarded sufficient property to meet her needs. 
Even if she were only awarded one-half of the parties' estate, she 
would receive a home and $200,000 of other property debt-free. 
Under the trial court's inequitable property division, she receives 
over $650,000 of property, again without encumbrance. All of the 
property was derivative of inter-vivos gifts from the defendant's 
parents. In these circumstances, alimony is inappropriate. See 
Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973). 
The plaintiff asserts that the trial court did not mention 
that the defendant was remarried and his spouse contributes toward 
the payment of his living expenses. Plaintiff's Brief at 36. 
However, the defendant, in his testimony at trial included this 
factor in the calculation of his living expenses. R. 943. Again, 
counsel for the plaintiff is seeking to introduce a factor into the 
court's decision which is simply not present. 
IX. IMPUTATION OF INCOME IMPROPER 
The trial court failed to make any specific finding that the 
defendant was unemployed or underemployed in ordered to impute 
income. Section 78-45-7 of the Utah Code requires that "income may 
not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount of imputed income or a hearing is held and a finding made 
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." In 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), this standard was 
applied to imputation of income for both child support and alimony 
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purposes. The plaintiff quotes Hall to the extent that § 78-45-
7(a) "does not specifically require a 'finding' of underemployment, 
to parrot the exact language of the statute," without quoting the 
remainder of that sentence, which reads "it is well established 
that where a statute expressly requires a trial court to make a 
threshold finding before taking specified judicial action, the 
trial court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first 
making the legislatively mandated finding." 858 P.2d at 1024. 
The findings of the trial court "do not become relevant until 
after it determines, as a threshold matter, that income should be 
imputed because the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed as required by" statute. Hall, 1018 P.2d at 1024. 
Absent such a specific finding, the trial court may be 
affirmed only if the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the 
factor or factors on which findings are missing or if the 
statutorily mandated findings are implied. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018. 
Here, however, at the time of trial Defendant was 60 years old (R. 
713, 714). The principal at Defendant's former school testified 
that it was unusual for someone to still be teaching at age 60 (R. 
717) . 
The court found that the Defendant "is working hard to make 
[the marital business] profitable. . . ." (R. 505). The Defendant 
worked more than forty hours per week for the business after he 
stopped teaching, but did not receive a salary (R. 678, 743). The 
trial court found that "Defendant is working more than full-time at 
the two businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as High Desert Marine, 
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and the Arma-Coating business, and is making a good faith and 
genuine effort to produce income at the same or hopefully even 
above the levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching." (R. 504). 
Further reasons given by the defendant for his not resuming his 
teaching position are given in the addendum attached hereto. (R. 
706-7). 
With these findings and evidence, the undisputed evidence does 
not clearly establish the factor or factors on which findings are 
missing or that the statutorily mandated findings are implied. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court in this case did not have the power to amend 
the findings after the judgment had already been entered. Those 
additional findings are unsupported by the evidence and contrary to 
the courts prior findings. The plaintiff was awarded property and 
alimony sufficient to meet her needs as found by the trial court. 
Defendant's retirement account was utilized for the benefit of the 
parties and with the stipulation of the plaintiff. At trial, the 
court did not fault the defendant for the liquidation of the 
account and found his actions to save the money the plaintiff had 
deposited on the condominium, against court order, to be 
reasonable. In any case, the retirement account, which was worth 
less than 10% of the marital estate is not sufficient grounds to 
make the inequitable distribution of the parties assets in this 
case. 
The trial court included the value of the ranch inherited by 
the defendant from his parents in distributing the marital estate. 
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Consequently, the defendant received 2.25% of the substantial 
marital estate, which consisted almost entirely of assets derived 
from an inter vivos gift of 40 acres of property from defendant's 
parents. This gift from the defendant's parents would be worth 
over $1,500,000 in current property values. The trial court 
awarded essentially the entire net value of the martial estate, all 
of which is derived from gifts from the defendants parents, to the 
plaintiff. The defendant, after paying the debts of the parties, 
is left with a ranch which has been in his family for several 
generation but produces no income. This offset by the trial court 
deprives the defendant, Clint Lytle, of the benefit of his 
inheritance and foils the testamentary intent of his parents, Ezra 
and Mae Lytle. 
If there are facts that could justify such a result, they are 
not present in this case. Instances where courts have acted to 
award separate property to the nondonee or nonheir spouse have 
always included an element of support for children or support for a 
spouse that is unable to support him or herself. Here, there are 
no minor children and the plaintiff, even if she were to only 
receive 50% of the marital estate, has property sufficient property 
to meet her needs. 
Although trial courts do not have to divide the marital estate 
with strict mathematical equality, equality is still required. The 
court's distribution of the marital estate in this matter is not 
equitable as required by § 30-3-5 of the Utah Code. The root of 
equitable is that the distribution be equal. The property 
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distribution in this case should be reversed and the marital estate 
equitably divided as provided in the Defendant's Brief. 
There was no finding by the trial court that the defendant was 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. In any case, it was 
inappropriate for the trial court to award alimony here as the 
plaintiff was provided with property sufficient to meet her 
financial needs. For these reasons, the award of alimony should be 
reversed. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 1997. 
SAMUEL G. DRAPER, ''FOR 
HUGHES & READ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Samuel G. Draper, certify that on October 20, 1997 I served 
a copy of the attached Brief upon G. Michael Westfall, the counsel 
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G. Michael Westfall 
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59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
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ADDENDUM: PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY REGARDING^^NCH 
954500316 VOL. I 10-10-96 
1 Q. -- Mountain Meadows property? 
2 A. We always helped out. We had to take care 
3 of the cattle, and Clint loved to work the ground 
4 and to plow. And he didn't like the hay, hauling of 
5 the hay. It was hard, but I rode with him on the 
6 tractors day after day and worked with him, but he 
7 --we did everything. 
8 We worked around his working time and 
9 stuff, but his -- his dad and mom were getting old 
10 and they were having a really hard time being able 
11 to do it. His dad had had a hip -- something wrong 
12 with his hip from the time he was a boy, and it was 
13 getting worse, and it was harder for him to walk. 
14 And so the kids and I were all the help that Clint 
15 had, and we worked at the ranch. 
16 Q. The kids and I, your children? 
17 A. Yes, my children. 
18 Q. Did Clint's parents live at the ranch? 
19 A. Yes, they lived there in the summers. In 
20 the winter they moved downtown because it was too 
21 cold for them. 
22 Q. And you indicate that -- that Clint helped 
23 out with the plowing --
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. -- things like that? Did you also 
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1 personally help out in terms of operating and 
2 maintaining the ranch? 
3 A. Yes. Yes. 
4 Q. What did you do? 
5 A. I learned to drive the tractor, this 
6 little red tractor, and I remember we were down in 
7 the fields and Clint was showing me how. And I 
8 remember that he got a little bit upset with me. 
9 When he got back to the house his dad told him or 
10 his mother, one of them, told him to be patient with 
11 me, I'd never driven a tractor before, but I did 
12 learn to drive a tractor. And I did follow him when 
13 he was disking and I would do the planting. And I 
14 would drive while we were loading the hay, and I've 
15 even hauled a truck and trailer to town with hay on 
16 it. And I just worked right along with him. 
17 Q. Okay. And this was primarily during the 
18 summer months? 
19 A. Yes. Uh-huh. We had to move the cows 
20 twice a year from the summer division to the 
21 winter -- (inaudible) -- and one year we rode 
22 horses and it was a three-day drive. And other 
23 times we loaded them in the truck and brought them 
24 back and then took them out, and I was always with 
25 Clint, always. 
b 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
224 
954500316 VOL. I 10-10-96 
1 Q. Okay. And was this work primarily done on 
2 weekends or was it done during the week? 
3 A. It was done on weekends and after school 
4 when he was teaching and then on every weekend we 
5 were up there working. It had -- it had to be 
6 done. Shawn was helping lift the hay. And they 
7 also put in big gardens, and we had to harvest those 
8 gardens. And I know that we'd go up and work all 
9 day and go home at night, and I'd take something 
10 home that I'd have to be up all night canning and 
11 then come up the next morning and --
12 Q. So the canning you would take all the way 
13 back to St. George to take care of? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. Did -- would Clint stay overnight 
16 up at the ranch or did you pretty much the family 
17 would come back, go home? 
18 A. Well, in the summertime we pretty much 
19 stayed up there, and in the wintertime we -- when he 
20 had to be to school the next morning, we would go 
21 back and forth. 
22 Q. So during the summer times, did the whole 
23 family -- did you actually live up there on the 
24 Mountain Meadows property? 
25 A. Yeah, pretty much kind of, especially when 
c 
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we were in California. We'd come up during the 
summer vacation, and we would just be working up 
there. And we just stayed up there. 
Q. So how long did this go on with you 
helping out to maintain and to operate the farming, 
ranching operations out on the Mountain Meadows 
property? 
A. It went on until Clint moved out in '95, 
and I helped. I helped with the cows. When he was 
ill with his heart surgery and his shoulder surgery 
and those other things, no one was around to feed 
the cows, and so I'd have to back the big trailer --
I'd drive the tractor, but I'd back the big trailer 
up to the hay stack and try to roll the bails off on 
to the trailer because they were too heavy for me to 
lift. And then 
the cows 
I'd drive the tractor up and feed 
and come back down. And I 
quite awhile whi 
him. 
Q. 
A. 
We 
Okay. 
I love 
d go up 
tractor that was 
and 
prop 
bail 
Q. 
erty, 
hay. 
There 
le he was 
did this for 
sick to help out. 
d to go up and ride 
at rnqht 
enclosed 
in his --
in and we' 
the tractor with 
the new big 
d ride in that 
was a portions of the Dixie Downs 
the original 40 acres that have been sold 
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1 factor. 
2 Q. Okay. Have alimony expenses been paid out 
3 of the boat shop, the alimony that you have paid to 
4 Ms. Lytle? 
5 A. The sources that have come for a lot of 
6 the alimony and the items that have paid off have 
7 come a lot of it from Arma Coating, and then in one 
8 of the times -- you know, we talked about, you know, 
9 that times were rougher -- (inaudible) -- about 
10 paying things off. I run up $12,000 on credit cards 
11 so that these things wouldn't be late. 
12 Q. The alimony? 
13 A. Pardon? 
14 Q. The alimony? 
15 A. So the alimony, the house payments, and 
16 they've still been late, but I have run up an extra 
17 12,000 trying to keep up and it's been -- it hasn't 
18 been all roses. 
19 Q. Okay. Mr. Lytle, we're going -- we're 
2 0 going to touch on alimony next. Why have you not 
21 resumed your position as a teacher? 
22 A. I think there's several reasons. The last 
23 -- the last few years have been extremely 
24 strenuous. Both my parents died, the items with my 
25 sisters was extremely difficult. I've been on 
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1 extended. 
2 Now, to some people that's not a lot, but 
3 it's very -- it keeps you very, very busy. I've run 
4 the ranch. I've worked the boat shop. So the hours 
5 in the day have been very long, and it reached a 
6 point where I was having a hard time keeping up with 
7 all of my commitments. 
8 As I talked to the superintendent, and 
9 those are the people that know me, know that I'm 
10 committed to schools, and I have always said whether 
11 age or whether sickness or whatever it might be, if 
12 the day comes when I can't give 100 percent to my 
13 kids, I'm not going to be there, and I wasn't. 
14 It's been extremely difficult listening to 
15 the crap that I've had to put up with the teachers 
16 talking about, oh, yeah, he's been doing this, he's 
17 been doing that, the conversations from school to 
18 school. It has not been an easy situation. If I 
19 were a parent, I would say, do I want my kid in that 
20 class? 
21 Although I know what my moral standards 
22 are and so does my stake president, I could not say 
23 to a parent, hey, this is the way it should be. You 
24 need to leave your kid here. I felt that would be 
25 difficult because I did not feel I could give 110 
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